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ABSTRACT
Domain squatting is a common adversarial practice where attack-
ers register domain names that are purposefully similar to popular
domains. In this work, we study a specific type of domain squatting
called “combosquatting,” in which attackers register domains that
combine a popular trademark with one or more phrases (e.g., bet-
terfacebook[.]com, youtube-live[.]com). We perform the first large-
scale, empirical study of combosquatting by analyzing more than
468 billion DNS records—collected from passive and active DNS data
sources over almost six years. We find that almost 60% of abusive
combosquatting domains live for more than 1,000 days, and even
worse, we observe increased activity associated with combosquat-
ting year over year. Moreover, we show that combosquatting is
used to perform a spectrum of different types of abuse including
phishing, social engineering, affiliate abuse, trademark abuse, and
even advanced persistent threats. Our results suggest that com-
bosquatting is a real problem that requires increased scrutiny by
the security community.
KEYWORDS
Domain Squatting; Combosquatting; Network Security; Domain
Name System
1 INTRODUCTION
The Domain Name System (DNS) [63, 64], is a distributed hierar-
chical database that acts as the Internet’s phone book. DNS’s main
goal is the translation of human readable domains to IP addresses.
The reliability and agility that DNS offers has been fundamental
to the effort to scale information and business across the Internet.
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Thus, it is not surprising that miscreants heavily rely on DNS to
scale their abusive operations.
In fact, domain squatting is a very common tactic used to facili-
tate abuse by registering domains that are confusingly similar [12]
to those belonging to large Internet brands. Past work has thor-
oughly investigated typosquatting (domain squatting via typograph-
ical errors) [13, 33, 48, 54, 67, 90], bit squatting (domain squatting via
accidental bit flips) [31, 68], homograph-based squatting (domains
that abuse characters from different character sets) [39, 44], and
homophone-based squatting (domains that abuse the pronunciation
similarity of different words) [69].
A type of domain squatting that has yet to be extensively studied
is that of “combosquatting.” Combosquatting refers to the combi-
nation of a recognizable brand name with other keywords (e.g.,
paypal-members[.]com and facebookfriends[.]com). While some
existing research uses other terms to describe combosquatting do-
mains (i.e.„ “cousin domains” [46]), this work only studies com-
bosquatting in the context of phishing abuse, failing to capture the
full spectrum of potential abuse. Thus, even though the general
concept of constructing these types of malicious domains is part
of the collective consciousness of security researchers, the commu-
nity lacks a large-scale, empirical study on combosquatting and
how it may be abused. Therefore, the security community has little
insight into which trademarks domain squatters commonly abuse,
how well existing blacklists capture such abuse, and which types
of abuse combosquatting is used for.
In this work, we conduct the first large-scale, longitudinal study
of combosquatting abuse to empirically measure its impact. By
combining more than 468 billion DNS records from both active and
passive DNS datasets, which span almost six years, we identify 2.7
million combosquatting domains that target 268 of the most popular
trademarks in the US, and we find that combosquatting domains
are 100 times more prevalent than typosquatting domains—despite
the fact that combosquatting has been less studied. Our study also
makes several key observations that help better characterize how
combosquatting is used for abuse.
First, we study the lexical characteristics of combosquatting do-
mains. We observe that combosquatting lacks generative models
and find that, while combosquatting domains vary in overall length,
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50% add at most eight additional characters to the original trade-
mark being abused. Furthermore, 40% of combosquatting domains
are constructed by adding a single token (Section 4.2) to the origi-
nal trademark. Thus, while the pool of potential combosquatting
domains is very large, we find that many instances of combosquat-
ting try and limit the overall length of the combosquatting domain.
Additionally, we find that combosquatting domains tend to prefer
words that are closely related to the underlying business category
of the trademark—resulting in combinations that are more targeted
than random.
Second, we analyze the temporal properties of combosquatting
domains and, surprisingly, we see that almost 60% of the abusive
combosquatting domains can be found in our datasets for more than
1,000 days—suggesting that these abusive domains can often go
unremediated. When combosquatting domains do become known
to the security community, it is often significantly after the threat
was seen in the wild. For example, 20% of the abusive combosquat-
ting domains appear on a public blacklist almost 100 days after we
observe initial resolutions in our DNS datasets, and this number
goes up to 30% for combosquatting domains observed in malware
feeds. To make matters worse, we observe a growing number of
queries to combosquatting domains year over year, which is in
stark contrast to better known squatting techniques like typosquat-
ting. Thus, combosquatting appears to be an increasingly effective
technique used by Internet miscreants.
Third, we discover and analyze numerous instances of com-
bosquatting abuse in the real world. Through a substantial crawl-
ing and manual labeling effort, we discover that combosquatting
domains are used to perform many different types of abuse that
include phishing, social engineering, affiliate abuse, and trademark
abuse (i.e., capitalizing on the popularity of trademarks to sell their
own products and services). By analyzing publicly available threat
reports, we also identified 65 combosquatting domains that were
used by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) campaigns. These find-
ings highlight the wide reaching impact of combosquatting abuse.
Finally, we manually analyzed various techniques attackers used to
drop malware and counter detection—leading to some interesting
discoveries surrounding the use of redirection chains and cookies.
In summary, combosquatting is a type of domain squatting that
has yet to be extensively studied by the research community. We
provide the first large-scale, empirical study to better understand
how attackers use combosquatting to perform a variety of abusive
behaviors. Our study examines the lexical characteristics, temporal
behavior, and real world abuse of combosquatting domains. We
find that not only does combosquatting abuse often appear to go
unremediated, but its popularity also appears to be on the rise.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we define combosquatting and discuss how it differs
from other types of DNS squatting. Additionally, we discuss how
combosquatting is used to facilitate many different types of abuse.
For example, Internet miscreants use combosquatting to perform
social engineering, drive-by-download attacks, malware communi-
cation, and Search Engine Optimization (SEO) monetization. Thus,
even though combosquatting has not been extensively studied, it
has far reaching implications.
2.1 DNS Squatting & Combosquatting
Combosquatting refers to the attempt of “borrowing” a domain
name’s reputation (or brand name) characteristics by integrating a
brand domain with other characters or words. Combosquatting dif-
fers from other forms of domain name squatting, like typosquatting
and bitsquatting [70], in two fundamental ways: first, combosquat-
ting does not involve the spelling deviation from the original trade-
mark and second, it requires the original domain to be intactwithin
a set of other characters. In this paper, we consider a domain name
being combosquatting based on the following definition.
Given the effective second level domain name (e2LD) of a le-
gitimate trademark, a domain is considered combosquatting if the
following two conditions are met: (1) The domain contains the
trademark. (2) The domain cannot result by applying the five ty-
posquatting models of Wang et al. [90].
For example, lets consider the trademark Example, such that it is
served by the domain name example[.]com and the e2LD of which
is example. Combosquatting domain names, based on this e2LD,
could include any combination of valid characters in the Domain
Name System, whether they are prepended or appended to the e2LD.
For instance, secure-example[.]com, myexample[.]com, another-
coolexample-here[.]com are cases of combosquatting. However,
wwwexample[.]com and examplee[.]com are not, since they violate
the second clause mentioned earlier. Table 1 shows examples of
the different squatting attacks against the youtube[.]com domain
name.
2.2 Combosquatting Abuse
In this section, we discuss the most common types of combosquat-
ting abuse. Despite common beliefs, combosquatting domains are
not only used for trademark infringement but are also regularly
used in a wide variety of abusive activities—including drive-by
downloads, malware command-and-control, SEO, and phishing. We
should note that all cases mentioned next were reported to the
registrars and law enforcement for remediation.
2.2.1 Phishing. In generic phishing attacks, where obtaining
the user’s credentials is the final goal of the adversary, the attacker
would likely register combosquatting domains close to the targeted
organization. For example, in Figure 1a we can see one of those
phishing campaigns against Bank of America (BoA) users that em-
ployees the bankofamerica-com-login-sys-update-online[.]com do-
main. It is worth noting that the phishing page that was hosted on
this combosquatting domain was nearly identical to the actual BoA
website. We argue that this visual similarity, when coupled with
Domain Name Squatting Type
youtube[.]com Original Domain
youtubee[.]com Typosquatting [67]
yewtube[.]com Homophone-Based Squatting [69]
youtubg[.]com Bitsquatting [70]
Y0UTUBE[.]com Homograph-Based Squatting [44]
youtube-login[.]com Combosquatting
Table 1: Examples of the different types of domain name squatting
for the youtube[.]com domain name.
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Figure 1: Examples of combosquatting abuse. (a) A typical phishing campaign against Bank of America using the domain bankofamerica-com-
login-sys-update-online[.]com. (b) The airbnbforbeginners[.]com domain uses the AirBnB brand to lure users and drop a malware obfuscated as
a Flash Update. (c) An example of trademark abuse against Victoria’s Secret using the domain name victoriassecretoutlet[.]org.
the bank’s brand name clearly embedded in the combosquatting
domain, makes it highly unlikely that everyday users of the web
would be able to detect this website as phishing.
2.2.2 Malware. Delivery of malware and drive-by attacks is
another interesting case of combosquatting abuse. For example, a
combosquatting domain can be used to redirect victims to a page
showing fake warnings to lure them into downloading malicious
software. Figure 1b shows the domain airbnbforbeginners[.]com
being used to lure new AirBnB users. Once users land on the page,
a Flash update request is shown to the end user in what looks like
a Windows dialogue prompt. Thus, the attack attempts to infect
the user by using alerts that suggest Flash Player is outdated and
then entice the user to download a malicious update.
In Table 2, we can see malware related domain names that were
used as Command and Control (C&C) points for botnets created
using popular malware kits (e.g., Zeus). While it is hard to know
for sure why attackers decide to use domains that contain popular
trademarks, such domains could evade manual analysis of malware
communications. The use of combosquatting domain names is not
limited to common malware families, like the ones in Table 2. As we
will see in Section 3.2, using public reports around targeted attacks
and Advance Persistent Threats (APTs), we identified more than 60
APT C&C domains that utilize combosquatting, abusing up to 12
different popular brand names.
2.2.3 Monetization. Next to malicious activities mentioned ear-
lier, combosquatting domains have been heavily exploited in trade-
mark infringement and Search Engine Optimization (SEO). In this
Domain Name Trademark Abuse Type
adobejam[.]in Adobe Artro C&C
norton360america[.]biz Norton Betabot Botnet
googlesale[.]net Google Etumbot
indexstatyahoo[.]com Yahoo Phoenix Kit
pnbcnews[.]ru NBC News Pkybot Botnet
wordpress-cdn[.]org WordPress Pkybot Botnet
youtubeee[.]ru YouTube Zeus Botnet
google-search[.]ru Google Zeus Botnet
Table 2: Examples of combosquatting domains used by malware as
Command and Control (C&C) points.
monetization category, the combosquatting domains often adver-
tise services similar or related to the original services and products
offered by the trademarks being abused. A real world example of
such a trademark infringing domain is presented in Figure 1c in
which the domain name victoriassecretoutlet[.]org abuses the Vic-
toria’s Secret trademark to offer likely counterfeit products at a
lower price.
3 MEASUREMENT METHODOLOGY
Measuring the extent of the combosquatting problem is particularly
hard because of the almost unlimited pool of potential domains.
However, given the definition of combosquatting in Section 2.1,
we provide a methodical way to identify combosquatting domains
using various datasets. Additionally, we discuss our rationale for
selecting trademarks that are most likely to be abused, the type of
datasets we use throughout our study, and introduce the necessary
notation utilized from this point on.
3.1 Trademark Selection
While all trademarks could be the subject of combosquatting abuse,
it is arguably not in the best interest of an adversary to use a
less known brand for abuse. In our hypothesis we assume that
the adversary would include the trademark name in the effective
second level domain (e2LD) as a way to lure victims into clicking
and interacting with the combosquatting domain and site.
To that extent, we first need to identify the set of popular domains
that are used by major brands (likely to be abused by adversaries).
To assemble this list of domains, we extracted the top 500 domain
names in the United States (US) fromAlexa [14]. Our decision to use
only the US-centric popular Alexa domains is due to the underlying
datasets we will use for our long-term study (which are mostly
US-centric), as we will see in the following section.
Now, even with the top 500 Alexa list, not all domains are appro-
priate candidates for our combosquatting analysis. This is because
(1) there are several brands that employ common words as their
brand name and (2) there are several domains and trademarks that
are too short to be considered for combosquatting. Table 3 shows a
list of trademarks that were ignored in the Alexa Top 500 due to
the previous considerations.
We manually inspected all 500 top Alexa domains to exclude
domains that fall into the two aforementioned categories. The re-
maining set contains 246 domains that we will consider in our
combosquatting study. We will refer to this list of domains as seed
3
Trademark Domain Potential Squat
Apple apple.com applejuice[.]com
AT&T att.com attorney[.]com, attack[.]com
Bing bing.com plumbing[.]com, tubing[.]com
citi (bank) citi.com cities[.]com, citizen[.]com
IKEA ikea.com bikeandride[.]com
Cisco cisco.com sanfrancisco[.]com
Table 3: Trademark examples that have been excluded fromour study.
throughout the rest of the paper. The trademarks selected belong
to companies that are active in different business categories. Thus,
we are able to group them together into 22 categories based on the
type of services/products they offer.
We derived this categorization using the Alexa list [14], the
TrendMicro [88] website and the DMOZ database [32]. We man-
ually verified the categories and merged any differences between
the platforms to create a consistent list. The vast majority of the
domains had a stable Alexa rank over time. At the same time, we
added seven domains that were a priori chosen in the “Politics” cat-
egory and 15 for the “Energy” category, following the same process
as before. We manually included the energy sector because it is
part of the critical infrastructure and the politics because of the US
Presidential elections of 2016.
3.2 Datasets
Since our goal is to study combosquatting both in depth and over
time, we require a variety of different datasets. Table 4 summarizes
the raw datasets used in this study, and Table 5 lists the most
important relationships between them. We provide more detail
about each of these datasets below.
Passive DNS: The passive DNS dataset (PDNS) consists of DNS
traffic collected since 2011, above a recursive DNS server located
in the largest Internet Service Provider (ISP) in the US. Specifically,
this dataset contains the DNS resource records (RRs) from all
successful DNS resolutions observed at the ISP, including their
daily lookup volume.
Active DNS: We also utilize an active DNS (ADNS) dataset,
which we obtain daily from the Active DNS project [24]. Since
the duration of this dataset is less than a year, it does not have a
complete temporal overlap with our PDNS dataset. While we will
use the PDNS and ADNS datasets for most measurement tasks,
we will also use a variety of smaller datasets to label and measure
abuse in these combosquatting datasets. Again, in Table 4 we can
see these five different datasets used in this study.
Public Blacklists: We collect historic public blacklisting (PBL)
information about domains that have been identified by the
security community as abusive and placed in various public
lists [2–9]. These blacklists have been collected from 2012 until
2016 and overlap with our passive and active DNS datasets.
Advanced Persistent Threats: Using public Advanced Persistent
Threat (APT ) reports 1, we manually extract and verify domain
names used in such documented attacks (APT).
Spam Trap: A security company provides us with spam trap [55]
data that is labeled using their proprietary detection engine (SPA).
Malware Feeds: The same security company and a university
provides us with two feeds of domains from dynamic execution of
malware samples since 2011 (MAL).
Alexa List: To eliminate potentially wrong classification of a
domain as abusive (false positive) in the aforementioned datasets,
we create a “whitelist” based on the Alexa list. We take the domains
that appeared in the top 10,000 of the Alexa list for more than 90
consecutive days in the last five years and create a set of domains
as indicators of benign activity (ALE).
Certificate Transparency: Google’s Certificate Transparency
(CT) [10] project provides publicly auditable, append-only logs
of certificates with cryptographic properties that can be used to
verify the legitimacy of certificates seen in the wild. The official CT
website provides a list of known, active logs that can be publicly
crawled. We used this list to download all records from those logs
up to April 13, 2017. This resulted in a dataset of approximately
271M certificates.
3.3 Linking Datasets
Next, we project the selected trademarks, into the raw datasets
presented in Table 4, and derive the trademark–specific datasets,
which can be seen in Table 5. The datasets in Table 5 will be used to
study the combosquatting problem in depth since 2011. We begin by
extracting the Combosquatting Passive (CP ) and Combosquatting
Active DNS (CA) set of domains, which reflect combosquatting
domains containing at least one of the trademarks of interest in the
Passive and Active DNS datasets, respectively. The cardinalities of
these two sets are of the order of millions of domain names (2.3M
for the CP set and 1M for the CA), and all combosquatting domain
abuse should be bounded by the size of the two sets.
Following the same process, we identify the combosquatting
domains in the PBL, APT, Spamtrap, Malware and Alexa sets, deriv-
ingCpbl ,Capt ,Cspa ,Cmal andCale , respectively. The cardinalities
of these sets can be seen in Table 5 where they span from a few
domains (Capt ) to several tens of thousands of domains (Cmal and
Cale ). Finally, we will defineCabuse as the set of domains in all ma-
licious categories of combosquatting domains, namely Cpbl , Capt ,
Cspa , and Cmal .
4 MEASURING COMBOSQUATTING
DOMAINS
In this section we present short and long term measurements re-
volving around the combosquatting domains in our datasets. We
begin by investigating the differences between typosquatting and
combosquatting. At the same time we discuss which words attack-
ers choose to combine with popular trademarks more frequently.
1http://tinyurl.com/apt-reports
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Dataset Type Size Records Time Period Notation
Passive DNS 18.1T 13.1 × 109 2011–01–01 to 2015–10–14 PDNS
Active DNS 30.5T 455 × 109 2015–10–05 to 2016–08–19 ADNS
Public BLs 26.7G 610 × 106 2012–12–09 to 2016–09–13 PBL
APT Reports N/A 21,927 2008–10–01 to 2016–11–04 APT
Spamtrap 35M 965,911 2009–07–17 to 2016–09–13 SPA
Malware Traces 34.8G 1.1 × 109 2011–01–01 to 2016–10–22 MAL
Alexa 42.9G 1.3 × 109 2012–12–09 to 2016–09–13 ALE
Certificate Transparency 842G 271 × 106 2013–03–25 to 2017–04–13 CERT
Table 4: Summary of the raw datasets used in this study.
Passive DNS Active DNS
α α ∩CP NoT NoC α ∩CA NoT NoV e2LDs Count
CP 2,321,914
CA 1,022,083
Cmal 9,283 179 21 6,886 174 21 9,472
Cpbl 3,750 135 21 4,787 128 21 5,844
Capt 59 11 8 56 12 8 65
Cspa 2,296 126 20 6,400 148 20 6,400
Cabuse 14,965 201 21 17,586 200 21 21,173
Cale 45,619 244 22 37,098 244 22 48,197
Table 5: The combosquatting datasets, and their relational statistical properties. NoT : Number of unique trademarks in a set of domains and
NoC : Number of unique business categories in a set of domains. Cabuse = {Cmal ∪Cpbl ∪Capt ∪Cspa }.
Then, we study the temporal properties of the domain names in the
combosquatting passive and active DNS datasets. This analysis will
help us understand how these combosquatting domains evolved
since 2011.
In particular, we observe that the number of combosquatting
domain names in our passive and active DNS datasets are steadily
increasing; in contrast, the domains in theCabuse set remain stable
over time. At the same time, we observer that the security commu-
nity is lagging behind the detection of malicious combosquatting
domains, in many cases up to several months, despite being an
obvious target of abuse. Finally, we provide an analysis of the DNS
and IP hosting infrastructure that combosquatters tend to employ.
The domains in the Cabuse set tend to utilize significantly more
agile hosting infrastructure, which could be used as a signal to
identify abusive combosquatting domains on the rise.
4.1 Combosquatting versus Typosquatting
Since typosquatting is, by far, the most researched type of domain
squatting, we begin our discussion of combosquatting by compar-
ing it with typosquatting. Figure 2 shows the number of active
typosquatting and combosquatting domains targeting our evalu-
ated trademarks since 2011. To identify typosquatting domains, we
use the five typosquatting models of Wang et al. [90] to generate
all possible typosquatting domains and search for those domains in
our DNS datasets. The left part of the plot is based on our passive
DNS dataset while the right part is based on the active DNS dataset.
One can clearly see that, even though combosquatting has evaded
the attention of researchers, it is significantly more prevalent than
typosquatting, with the number of daily combosquatting domains
being almost two orders of magnitude larger than the number of
typosquatting domains.
In comparison with other types of domain squatting phenom-
ena such as typosquatting, combosquatting has a unique property
in that it lacks a generative model. For all other types of domain
squatting, researchers can start with an authoritative domain, and
by performing character and bit swaps, they can exhaustively list
the possible squatting permutations for a given type of domain
squatting. For example, the dotted line in Figure 2 indicates the
maximum number of typosquatting domains possible when consid-
ering the evaluated trademarks and typosquatting models [90]. In
combosquatting, however, attackers are free to prefix and postfix
a trademark with one or more keywords of their choice, bounded
only by the maximum number of characters allowed for any given
label by the DNS protocol [65, 66].
Another difference that is closely related to the lack of a gener-
ative model, in terms of attack scenarios, has to do with the way
attacks are rendered. Typosquatting can be a passive attack for the
adversary, who simply must wait until a user accidentally types in
a domain. However, combosquatting requires more active involve-
ment from the attacker because, while a user may accidentally type
paypa[.]com instead of paypal[.]com, an attacker cannot register
paypal-members[.]com and reasonably expect users will acciden-
tally type those eight extra characters. Therefore, miscreants that
rely on combosquatting must coerce users (e.g. via spam emails
and social networks) to visit combosquatting domains.
To increase the chances that users will interact with their mali-
cious combosquatting domains, attackers can use services like Let’s
Encrypt [56] to both freely and automatically obtain TLS certifi-
cates for their domains. In fact, Let’s Encrypt has recently come
5
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Date
103
104
105
106
V
ol
um
e
Combosquatting
Typosquatting
Maximum Typosquatting
2016
103
104
105
106
Figure 2: Number of active Combosquatting and Typosquatting domain names per day. The left hand side part of the plot depicts the passive DNS
period, whereas the right one reflects domains found in the active DNS dataset.
under criticism for choosing to eschew any sort of security checks
before giving domain owners a TLS certificate [11]. To quantify the
frequency with which attackers obtain certificates for their mali-
cious domains, we searched the 271 million certificates obtained
via the Certificate Transparency append-only log (described in Sec-
tion 3.2) and discovered that 691,182 certificates were given to a
total of 107,572 fully-qualified combosquatting domains related to
our trademarks, since 2013, with 41.5% of the certificates being
issued by Let’s Encrypt. In contrast, only 3,011 certificates were
issued for typosquatting domains. This finding further confirms the
intuition that typosquatting and combosquatting are two distinct
phenomena with different threat models and attack strategies.
In summary, we argue that existing domain squatting detection
systems are not taking combosquatting domains into account (since
they cannot generate them) and combosquatting requires its own
analysis due to the scale of the problem and the different threat
models involved.
4.2 Lexical Characteristics
The lack of generative models for combosquatting, makes it hard to
proactively create and evaluate domains. Therefore, we utilize the
DNS datasets mentioned previously, to identify combosquatting
domains and analyze their composition. In particular, we see that
adversaries do not usually register lengthy domains and do not
use many words when generating the domains. We also find that
there are certain words that adversaries favor when generating
abusive combosquatting domains. Some words are independent of
the trademark’s business category, and other words are specific to
a single category.
Figure 3a shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF)
of the length of all identified combosquatting domains. There we
can see that even though an attacker can, in principle, construct
very long domains, 60% of the identified combosquatting domains
were using less than ten characters and 80% of the combosquatting
domains were using less than 22 characters (excluding the original
squatted trademark). This provides an early indication that the
vast majority of the attackers carefully construct combosquatting
domain names without attempting to reach the limits afforded to
them by the DNS protocol.
To better understand the construction of combosquatting do-
mains, we extract the non-Top Level Domain (non-TLD) part of each
domain (e.g. we extract facebookfriends from facebookfriends
[.] com) and use theword segmentation algorithm described in [79].
This algorithm takes a string as input and outputs sequences of
that string that have a high probability of being standalone tokens,
along with a confidence score for the provided tokenization.
We validate the output tokens provided for each combosquatting
domain against four dictionaries: (1) the PyEnchant en_US Python
dictionary [76] to identify English words, (2) the No Swearing dic-
tionary [16] to identify swearing-related words, and both (3) the
SWOPODS [81] and (4) No Slang [15] dictionaries to identify slang
words in US English. Tokens that are found in any of these dictio-
naries are referred to as words and, when not found, we simply call
them segments.
Figure 3b depicts a CDF of the number of tokens and number of
words that were identified for each domain. We see that almost 80%
of the domains have at most two dictionary-words present, and
90% have at most three words. At the same time, we have found a
limited number of cases that contain up to 28 words and segments.
These results validate our earlier length-based claim that squatters
appear to be methodical in their construction of combosquatting
domain names. We note that stop words and other short words have
not been removed from our datasets because they are frequently
used by combosquatting domains.
Figure 3c shows the correlation of segments (cyan) and actual
words (blue). Every bin in the radial histogram represents the num-
ber of tokens identified in each domain. The presented percentage
captures the number of actual words versus segments that we were
able to distinguish. As we can see, the middle ranges of token counts
(6 to 19) have a lot more segments than words, whereas when the
domain consists of fewer tokens, the number of words found in the
dictionaries mentioned earlier increases. On average, half of the
tokens are words and the other half are segments. This is likely an
artifact of the attackers’ attempts to register domains that might
include typos or several strings close to words, which could be
overlooked by the targets, in order to increase their arsenal of com-
bosquatting domains. Consider, for example, the following list of
domain names that we identified as combosquatting and all point
to a credit card activation campaign.
activatemycrbankofamerica[.]com
activatemycrebankofamerica[.]com
activatemycredbankofamerica[.]com
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Figure 3: Lexical Characteristics of combosquatting domains. (a) Length of the Combosquatting domain names, including and excluding the
original trademark. (b) CDF of the number of segments and words. We limit the x-axis of the outer plot for the sake of readability. (c) Number of
segments used in combosquatting domain names. For each number of segments the percentage of English words is presented in blue color.
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Figure 4: Normalized and absolute size of the combosquatting domains in our datasets per business category.
activatemycredibankofamerica[.]com
activatemycreditbankofamerica[.]com
activatemycreditcabankofamerica[.]com
activatemycreditcarbankofamerica[.]com
activatemycreditcardbankofamerica[.]com
In terms of the words that attackers combine with abused trade-
marks, the top twenty words across all trademark categories were:
free, online, code, store, sale, air, best, price, shop, head, home, shoes,
work, www, cheap, com, new, buy, max, and card. Since the top
twenty words represent all of our 22 categories, they include terms
that can be found either in one or multiple trademark categories.
For example, the word “free” can be found in 12 of the 22 categories,
suggesting that attackers commonly combine the word “free” with
popular trademarks associated with paid goods (such as shopping,
movies, and TV shows) to lure users into interacting with their
websites. Contrastingly, certain words appear in a single category
of trademarks, such as “cheap” which is found only in the online
shopping category.
Due to space limitations, we make Table 10 available in the
Appendix that presents the ten most frequent words for each trade-
mark category. We see that many of the popular words closely
correlate with the type of trademark being abused, like the words
apple, game and phones being popular in the “Computers/Internet”
category and the words president, vote, and elect being popular
in the “Politics” category. The word selection by the adversaries
clearly indicates that most registered combosquatting domains have
been carefully constructed to match the expected context of each
abused trademark. This is a property unique to combosquatting,
since any other type of squatting is bounded to the squatted domain
name itself. For example, the search space in typosquatting, from
which adversaries can choose domain names is bounded to the
length of the domain and the characters used, limiting the agility
and multiformity of the threat.
4.3 Temporal Analysis
In Section 3.1 we presented our process for selecting the trademarks
we use in our study, and in Section 3.2 we discussed the different
datasets we use to measure the phenomenon. Using these trade-
marks and the dataset notation from Table 5, we study the temporal
properties of combosquatting domains since 2011. We find that
clients are increasingly resolving combosquatting domains and that
more than half of all combosquatting domains share a minimum
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Figure 5: Infrastructure characteristics of combosquatting domains. (a) A CDF of the domain name lifetime in the CP set. (b) The difference
between the time a combosquatting domain name was first seen in our datasets and the day it first appeared in a Public Blacklist, the Malware
Traces dataset, or the security vendor’s spam trap. The plot shows the cumulative volume of domains over time, normalized by the maximum
number of domains in each dataset. (c) The DNS lookup volume for the domain names in the CP set vs. the malicious (Cabuse ) domains.
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Figure 6: Distribution of the Alexa ranks for combosquatting do-
mains since 2011. The plot depicts the mean rank for the domain
names over the period of our Cale dataset.
lifespan of at least three months; in contrast, the majority of abusive
domains are active for more than a year. We also see that malicious
domains appear in the DNS datasets several months before they
appear in our abusive dataset and they even make it into the top
thousands ranks in the Alexa list.
Figure 4 shows the number of combosquatting domain names
we were able to place in the passive (left) and active (right) DNS
datasets. The orange color represents the total number of com-
bosquatting domain names we are able to identify in our datasets
for each of the trademark categories. Blue shows the normalized
number based on the number of trademarks that appeared in each
category. While most of the combosquatting domain names are
in “Information Technology” related categories, our dataset is
not biased, as the sets CP and CA contain a significant number of
domains across all trademarks and business categories.
By focusing our attention on the combosquatting passive DNS
set, we can see the days in which a combosquatting domain name is
available in our datasets. Figure 5a shows the CDF of this lifetime of
the domains in theCP set. Wemeasure the lifetime of a combosquat-
ting domain as the number of days between the first and last time
we saw it appearing in our passive DNS dataset. Almost 50% of the
domain names in the CP set were active for at least 100 days. In the
same figure, we can observe the malicious class of combosquatting
domain names, which are in the Cabuse set (presented earlier in
Table 5).
Interestingly, Figure 5a also shows that the lifetime of abusive
combosquatting domains is greater than the entire combosquatting
passive DNS set. This makes intuitive sense because a large number
of abusive combosquatting domains facilitate malicious network
communication for prolonged periods of time.
Figure 5b presents how fast the community comes across these
combosquatting domains. In the cases of domains from the sets
Cmal andCpbl , we see that most domains are active several months
before they appear in malware traces, or get listed in public black
lists. The only exception is the spam trap that the security vendor
is operating, where more than 50% of the domain names in the
Cspa set appear in passive DNS either a few days before, or on
the same day that they appear in the spam trap. One reasonable
explanation for this behavior is that it is an artifact of the type of
abuse (i.e., spam monetization and social engineering) that these
combosquatting domains facilitate.
In order to measure the overall popularity of the domains in the
combosquatting passive DNS (CP ) dataset over time, in Figure 5c
we show the DNS lookup volume growth since 2011, according
to our PDNS dataset. To put things into perspective, in the same
figure, we plot the lookup volume of domains in the Cabuse set.
It is interesting to observe that while the domains in the CP set
have a steady growth over time, the lookup volume of malicious
domain names in the setCabuse appears to be nearly uniform. Even
though we lack a definite explanation of this behavior, our earlier
spam-trap-related results suggest that this almost uniform activity
is an artifact of the type of combosquatting abuse (i.e. related to
spam and social engineering) that the security industry can reliably
detect.
Another interesting observation is related to the Alexa popular-
ity of combosquatting domains. Figure 6 shows the distributions
of combosquatting domains across the top 1 million Alexa ranks,
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Figure 7: Infrastructure distributions for combosquatting Domains. (a) Number of combosquatting domains per CIDR, ASN, and Country for all
combosquatting domain names. The inset plot shows the CIDR, ASN, Country Code frequency distribution per combosquatting domain in the
CP andCA sets. (b) Number of malicious domains (Cabuse ) per CIDR, ASN, Countries. The inner plot shows CIDR, ASN, Countries per malicious
(Cabuse ) combosquatting domain. (c) CDFs for the number of IP addresses that domains in the combosquatting (CP and CA) and malicious
(Cabuse ) utilize during their lifetime.
both for combosquatting domains that are known to be malicious
(present in any of our abuse datasets) as well as for all of the re-
maining combosquatting domains. First, we can observe that, as we
move from higher to lower rankings, the concentration of generic
combosquatting domains increases. Even so, the overall number of
combosquatting domains that are present in the top 1 million Alexa
list is limited. In terms of the distribution of malicious combosquat-
ting domains, there we see the presence of malicious domains across
all Alexa ranks, which suggests that the existing tools for detecting
malicious domains are finding only a small fraction of live attacks,
regardless of the overall number of combosquatting activity in any
given bin of Alexa ranking. We should note that Figure 6 shows
aggregate statistics of 20,000 bins in the x-axis. Therefore, the far
left domains are cases of combosquatting domains that have made
it into any of the top 20,000 Alexa ranks.
4.4 Infrastructure Analysis
So far we have examined how the domains in the combosquatting
passive DNS dataset evolved over time. In this section, we turn our
attention to the various DNS and IP properties that the domains
in the combosquatting passive and active DNS dataset exhibit. We
see that the hosting infrastructure of malicious combosquatting
domains is concentrated in certain autonomous systems and they
are scattered across numerous different CIDRs—which is different
from the behavior of combosquatting domains in general.
Figure 7a shows the distribution of Classless Inter-Domain Rout-
ing (CIDR) networks, Autonomous Systems (AS), and Country
Codes (CC) for the hosting facilities of CP and CA combosquatting
domains. As expected, generic combosquatting activity is spread
across the globe with no obvious concentrations.
We cannot claim the same for the domains in the Cabuse set.
In Figure 7b, we can see a higher concentration of malicious com-
bosquatting domains from the Cabuse set in a single CIDR and AS.
That is, almost 58% of the malicious domains are in one CIDR, where
only 38% of all combosquatting domains live in a single network.
The preference that malicious domains have a single CIDR/AS can
be explained in the following two ways. There are few CIDRs and
ASes around the world that will permit the long term hosting of
malicious domains. At the same time, such malicious combosquat-
ting domains eventually will be remediated, as we saw earlier in
this section. This will practically mean that they will be pointed to
a DNS sinkhole or a domain parking page.
With this behavior in mind, we tried to better understand both
the bipartite graph between the domains in the combosquatting
passive and active DNS datasets, and also in the Cabuse set. With
Figure 7c we observe that domains in the set Cabuse point to hosts
that are spread across more distinct CIDRs than the domains in the
CP and CA set. While the rotation on malicious IP infrastructure
might not be a new observation, in the reduced space of combosquat-
ting domains, this behavior could be used not only as a way to both
track combosquatting domains over time, but also to alert us of
potentially new abusive ones.
5 COMBOSQUATTING IN THEWILD
So far we have shed light to the combosquatting phenomenon over
a period of almost five years. We have shown the complexity of
the combosquatting problem by studying its lexical, infrastructure,
and temporal properties in Section 4. This section focuses on how
combosquatting domains are being used in the wild. We study
different aspects of combosquatting abuse, at the time of writing,
and show how combosquatting can be used for many different types
of illicit activities.
We show that combosquatting domains are currently being used
for a variety of attacks (e.g. phishing, affiliate abuse, social engineer-
ing, trademark abuse). While we study trademarks spread across
different business categories, these attacks affect almost every cat-
egory. We manually analyze a set of combosquatting domains in
order to further examine their network behavior and the counter-
measures the adversaries take to evade detection.
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5.1 Exploring & Labeling Combosquatting
Domains
In order to understand the current status of combosquatting do-
mains and potential attacks rendered using them, we built an infras-
tructure of 100 scriptable browser instances and used them to crawl
1.3 million combosquatting domains, which were all part of CA
(active DNS dataset). The 1.3 million domains were comprised of
1.13 million initial seed domains (note that we have slightly more
domains than the ones reported in Table 5 since we may crawl
multiple subdomains per e2LD). On top of that, we also crawl 200
thousand domains, which included daily registrations of new com-
bosquatting domains and other domains that switched to unknown
NS server infrastructure (e.g. non-brand protection companies). Our
crawlers were tracking these changes for four weeks and were able
to successfully crawl approximately 1.1 million domains.
Due to the sheer size of the collected data and the need of man-
ual verification by human analysts, we approach the dataset we
collected through crawling in three sequential steps. First, we scan
our entire dataset for evidence of affiliate abuse, i.e., combosquat-
ting domains that redirect users to their intended destination but
add an affiliate identifier while doing so. This check will result in
the scammer earning a commission from the user’s actions [80].
Second, we look in the remainder of the dataset for phishing pages
by identifying login forms (from HTML inspection) and focusing on
the web pages that are “visually similar” to the legitimate websites.
Finally, in order to understand the type of abuse that is neither
phishing nor affiliate abuse, we perform a combination of strati-
fied and simple random sampling on our remaining dataset and
manually label 8.7 thousand web pages.
All this effort will yield two important points for our study. First,
this will help the reader get a sense of how combosquatting is
currently used in social engineering and affiliate abuse. Second, we
augment theCabuse set of malicious combosquatting domains that
escape the threat feeds we used in our study. The next paragraph
will provide more details about each step and the discovered abuse.
Affiliate abuse. First, we scan all pages of our crawled corpus
focusing on the ones that, through a series of redirections, navigated
our crawlers to the appropriate authoritative domains. By excluding
domains that, through their WHOIS records and name servers,
we identified as clearly belonging to the legitimate owners of the
authoritative domains, we manually investigate the rest of the
redirection chains and identify 2,573 unique domains that were, for
at least one day, involved in affiliate abuse.
Phishing. We scan the HTML code of all the crawled pages that
were neither legitimately owned nor abusing affiliate programs,
and identify 40,299 unique domains that contain at least one login
form. We then proceed to cluster these webpages by their visual
appearance using a hamming distance on the hashes produced by
a perceptual hashing function, a process which resulted in 7,845
clusters. We then focus on the clusters that contain screenshots
that are similar to the look-and-feel of the targeted brands, so as to
remove unrelated pages that happen to have login forms. Through
this process, we identify 174 domains as conducting phishing at-
tacks. Table 6 shows the trademarks that were attacked by four or
Trademark #Phishing Example
Facebook 56 facebook123[.]cf
icloud 48 icloudaccountuser[.]com
Amazon 7 secure5-amazon[.]com
Google 8 drivegoogle[.]ga
PayPal 8 paypal-updates[.]ml
Instagram 7 wvwinstagram[.]com
Baidu 4 baidullhk[.]com
Table 6: Examples of domains used for phishing, as discovered by our
crawling infrastructure.
more combosquatting domains. Even though this number may ap-
pear to be small, these were short-lived live phishing domains that
we discovered in the wild targeting the users of our investigated
trademarks.
Other types of abuse. Last, we focus on the top two Alexa do-
mains of each of the trademark categories (stratified sampling),
resulting in the selection of 221,292 combosquatting domains tar-
geting the selected trademarks. Using perceptual hashing in the
same way as we did for the identification of phishing pages, we
cluster 351 thousand screenshots of websites (note that many of
the 221 thousand combosquatting domains were crawled multiple
times due to infrastructure changes that were deemed suspicious)
into 50 thousand clusters. The trademark responsible for the largest
number of clusters (8.3 thousand) was Amazon which, due to its
name, “attracts” thousands of combosquatting websites which are
not necessarily related to each other, and thus create clustering
singletons. To label the screenshots, we randomly sample 10% of the
domains of each affected brand and manually label them, resulting
in a manual analysis effort of 8.7 thousand screenshots.
The labeling was performed by the authors where each one chose
among the following labels: social engineering (surveys, scams such
as tech support scam [62], malicious downloads), trademark abuse
(websites capitalizing on the brand of the squatted trademarks), un-
related (seemingly benign and unrelated websites), and error/under
construction. Finally, the resulting labels are then used to label the
entire clusters in which each sampled screenshot belongs. Table 7
shows the overall abuse of the investigated trademarks by consoli-
dating the results of the previous two steps, the manual labeling
of the stratified random sample and removing all the authorative
domains from the list. Table 8 shows the types of abuse for each
category of trademarks by focusing on the abuse of its most popu-
lar domain (grey cells denote the most popular type of abuse per
trademark category). There we see that while trademark abuse is
usually the most popular type of abuse, the exact breakdown varies
across categories. For example, for both amazon and homedepot,
affiliate abuse is the most popular type of abuse, fueled by the fact
that these two services offer affiliate programs to their users.
5.2 Case Studies
On October 30th of 2016, we crawled 505 combosquatting domain
names that were hosted on the same infrastructure. That is, the
domain names were pointing to the same set of IP addresses on that
day according to the active DNS dataset. To better understand how
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Unknown 86.6% Unrelated 11.23%Suspicious 1 88.77%
Malicious 13.39%
Phishing 0.9%
Social Engineering 13.62%
Affiliate Abuse 15.56%
Trademark Abuse 69.9%
1 Includes under construction, error pages and parking
websites.
Table 7: Types of combosquatting pages
Category Trademark PH AB SE TA
Adult Content pornhub 0% 5.14% 25.73% 69.11%
Blogging wordpress 0% 0.06% 2.93% 96.96%
Computers microsoft 0.32% 11.0% 13.68% 74.39%
E-Shop (Online) amazon 0.36% 61.65% 1.47% 36.50%
Financial paypal 6.29% 0.78% 55.11% 37.79%
Radio & TV netflix 2.29% 5.74% 19.54% 72.41%
E-Learning wikipedia 0% 0% 32.58% 67.14%
Lifestyle diply 0% 0% 1.6% 98.4%
News reddit 1.49% 0% 1.49% 97.01%
Couriers fedex 0% 3.12% 25% 71.87%
E-Shop (C2C) craigslist 0% 0% 31.10% 68.89%
Photography pinterest 0% 0% 5.76% 94.23%
E-Shop (Physical) homedepot 0% 72.5% 2.5% 25%
Search Engines google 0.32% 3.58% 23.49% 72.32%
File Sharing dropbox 2.7% 16.21% 51.35% 29.72%
Social Networks facebook 5.24% 6.18% 18.74% 69.82%
Software & Web popads 0% 0% 0% 100%
Streaming youtube 0% 2.02% 14.5% 83.47%
Telecom xfinity 2.85% 14.28% 11.42% 71.42%
Travel airbnb 0% 4.04% 1% 94.95%
Table 8: Types of combosquatting abuse for the most popular investi-
gated domain within each trademark category (PH = phishing, AB =
affiliate abuse, SE = social engineering, TA = trademark abuse).
adversaries take advantage of combosquatting domains, we set up a
headless crawling engine based on the Python requestsmodule, that
collects Layer 7 (in the OSI stack) information. Our experimental
setup had two phases: first we crawled the domains using the default
configuration of the module and then we repeated the process
specifying a Chrome User-Agent. By comparing crawling results
from the two phases, we were able to identify the presence of
evasive behavior against our crawlers based on factors like HTTP
headers, client’s IP address and cookies’ presence.
Redirection Games. Most of the domains were associated with
a form of redirection, either to a parking page, or to an abuse-
related website. A set of 114 domains were performing at least one
redirection irrespective of the User-Agent HTTP header. When the
User-Agent was not set, 28 domains did not redirect and presented
a parking page. This set grew to 127 when User-Agent headers
were used. Redirection to the parking page was performed via a
child label for the same domain name, following the same naming
convention: the child label starts with ww followed by a number (i.e.
starbucksben[.]com redirects to ww1.starbucksben[.]com).
Figure 8: The JavaScript redirection performed by some combosquat-
ting domain names. This example is the result of visiting chevrontex-
acobusinescard[.]com. Line 5 had a 1,838 characters long string.
Moreover, there was a set of 53 domains that was performing
HTTP redirection without User-Agent, but JavaScript redirection
when the User-Agent was set. In the latter case, the HTTP response
contained highly obfuscated JavaScript code similar to the one in
Figure 8.
Malware Drops. One interesting example that shows how
adversaries are hiding the behavior of a domain from auto-
mated systems and crawlers, is http://zillowhomesforsale[.]com.
When no User-Agent is present, the domain always redi-
rected to http://ww1.zillowhomesforsale[.]com/, which
served us with a parking template. When the User-Agent
was set, the redirection would be to either the afore-
mentioned URL or to a completely different domain (i.e.
http://rtbtracking[.]com/click?data=Mm[...]Q2&id=8c[...]d3), based
on a probabilistic algorithm.
After we identified the attempt of the domains to hide their real
behavior, we tried to extract further information. We setup two
Virtual Machines (VMs) on a MacBook Pro running Mac OS 10.11.6
and Avast Mac Security 2015 Version 11.18 (46914) with Virus def-
initions version 16103000. The first VM was an Ubuntu 14.04.1
and the second a Mac OS 10.11.6. We started manually browsing
to the domain names mentioned earlier and we identified several
instances of malicious websites and URLs we were redirected to.
For example, zillowhomesforsale[.]com this time redirected us
to http://www.searchnet[.]com/Search/Loading?v=5 which was
blocked by Avast and classified as RedirMe-inf [Trj], a well known
trojan (http://malwarefixes.com/threats/htmlredirme-inf-trj/). Sim-
ilarly, when we browsed to youtubezeneletoltes[.]net we came
across an automatic downloader of a disk image file named “Flash-
Player.dmg”. It contained a binary that we submitted to VirusTo-
tal for analysis. The results pointed to malware, since 15/54 An-
tivirus reports were suggesting some type of Trojan or Adware
(http://bit.ly/2ffwyW1).
Some of the combosquatting domains that we experi-
mented with would redirect us to an authoritative website
(not necessarily the one they were abusing), after appending
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an affiliate identifier in the URL, essentially conducting affil-
iate abuse. For instance, visiting jcpenneyoulet[.]com lands
on http://www.jcpenney[.]com/?cm_mmc=google%20non-
[...] and visiting toysrusuk[.]com yields
http://www.target[.]com/?clkid=4738[...]. Interestingly, after
visiting one of the websites a cookie would be set on the user’s
browser. If the user attempted to visit another website (from the
same set of domains), she would find herself on a parking page [89].
After clearing cookies and repeating the process, the domain would
reveal its true nature.
Social Engineering and Phishing. Another type of abuse
we identified was related to social engineering and
phishing types of attacks. After visiting some domains
like stapleseaseyrebates[.]com, we were redirected to
http://viewcustomer[.]com/s3/p10/index-20up-p10-cnf-t1-
p4.php?tracker=wait.loading-links.com&keyword=staples1[...].
The landing page presented us with a survey for Staples that
would supposedly reward us with a gift after completing it, clearly
not related to the Staples business in any way. These surveys are
meant to collect as much PII as possible from users and subscribe
them to potentially paid services [29].
6 DISCUSSION
In Sections 2 through 5, we presented the intuitions behind com-
bosquatting domains, how they are different than other types of
domain squatting, and quantified their current level of abuse. Specif-
ically, we found that combosquatting, despite its relative obscurity,
is more popular than typosquatting (Section 4.1). Further, we found
that combosquatters carefully crafted their domain names to ac-
count for the businesses to which the abused trademarks belong
to (Section 4.2). By cross-referencing our list of combosquatting
domains with popular blacklists, we observed that most domains
are active for several months before appearing on these lists (Sec-
tion 4.3), suggesting the presence of blind spots in the tools used
by the security industry. We identified that a few ASes were re-
sponsible for the long-term hosting of malicious combosquatting
domains (Section 4.4) and witnessed how both common botnets
and targeted APTs utilize combosquatting domains to benefit from
trademark recognition and remain hidden in plain sight. Finally, by
actively crawling 1.3 million combosquatting domains and labeling
the results, we witnessed live phishing domains and the abuse of
trademarks across all studied business categories (Section 5.1).
Given the magnitude of the combosquatting problem, in this
section, we discuss what can be done in terms of countermeasures
against combosquatting from the viewpoint of different actors in
the domain name ecosystem.
Registrants. A defense that is commonly proposed against tradi-
tional types of domain squatting are defensive registrations. In defen-
sive registrations, companies can proactively register domains that
are likely to be abused (e.g. Microsoft owns wwwmicrosoft[.]com
which redirects users to microsoft[.]com) before miscreants have a
chance of registering them. Combosquatting, however, is unique in
the sense that it lacks a generative model (discussed in Section 4.1).
As such, even for companies that can afford a large number of
defensive registrations, there is no single algorithm (like the typo
models of Wang et al. [90]) that could be used to generate a list
of combosquatting domains. Therefore, the burden of protecting
against combosquatting domains cannot rest on registrants.
At the same time, we consider it of crucial importance that
tradermark owners stop utilizing the practice of registering benign
combosquatting domains for their business. For example, the
domain paypal-prepaid[.]com belongs to PayPal and advertises the
ability to use PayPal to obtain prepaid debit cards. By using these
types of domains, companies are indirectly training users that do-
mains that contain their trademark are legitimate, making it harder
for every day users to detect the malicious ones (which, as discussed
in Section 4.1, will also have TLS certificates). Instead, trademark
owners can use filepaths (e.g. www.paypal[.]com/prepaid),
subdomains (e.g. prepaid.paypal[.]com) or even TLDs (e.g.
prepaid[.]paypal) to advertise their products without the risks
associated with the registration of combosquatting domains.
Registrars. Registrars are in the unique position to know which
domains users are trying to register before they actually register
them. Therefore, we argue that registrars could add extra logic in
their fraud-detection systems to flag domains that contain popular
trademarks (following a process similar to ours). For each flagged
domain, the registrar can either request more information from
the users who attempt to register them, or follow up on those
domains to ensure that they are not used for malicious purposes.
Even though there will always be registrars who do not wish to
implement such countermeasures and who turn a blind eye to
abuse, over time, these registrars and all the domains registered
through them could be treated by domain-intelligence systems
as “suspicious.” This unwanted labeling will translate to loss of
income forcing registrars to either adopt fraud-detection systems,
or risk further loss of business.
Third parties. Next to registrars, there exist a wide array of sys-
tems [18–20, 41–43] which analyze newly registered domains in
an attempt to discover abusive ones before they are weaponized.
Similar to the extra step for registrars, we argue that searching for
the presence of popular trademarks in newly registered domains
can be an extra source of signal that can be exploited to identify
malicious registrations.
7 RELATEDWORK
DNS Abuse.Weimer et al. [91] proposed collecting passive DNS
data for security analysis. Since then, researchers have used
passive DNS data to build domain name reputation systems
using statistical modeling methods to detect abuse on the
Internet [18–20, 25, 59, 74, 77, 92]. More recently, Lever et al. [57]
used passive DNS to identify potential domain ownership changes.
Hao et al. [43] uses only registration features to build domain
reputation system. Liu et al. [58] revealed that dangling DNS
records pointing to invalid resources can be easily manipulated
for domain highjacking. Chen et al. [28] used passive DNS data to
estimate the financial abuse of advertising ecosystem by a large
botnet.
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Squatting Abuse. Several studies have focused on domain squat-
ting in general. Jakobsson et al. [46, 47] proposed techniques for
identifying typosquatting and discovered that websites in cate-
gories with higher PPC ad prices face more typosquatting regis-
trations. Wang et al. [90] proposed models for the generation of
typosquatting domains from authoritative ones. Agten et al. [13]
studied typosquatting using crawled data over a period of seven
months finding, among others, that few trademark owners protect
themselves by defensively registering typosquatting domains. In
addition to typosquatting, Nikiforakis et al. [70] quantify the extent
to which attackers are leveraging bitsquatting [31], where random
bit-errors occurring in the memory of commodity hardware can
redirect Internet traffic to attacker-controlled domains. Their ex-
periments show that new bitsquatting domains are registered daily
and monetized through ads, affiliate programs and even malware
installations. The authors later performed a measurement of the
so-called “soundsquatting”, where attackers abuse homophones to
attract users and confuse text-to-speech systems [69].
The only work on combosquatting other than this paper is a
brief 2008 industry whitepaper [1]. Starting with 30 trademarks
and up to 50 generic keywords the authors constructed possible
combosquatting domains and then attempted to get traffic data
for the 500 domains that were registered. The authors found that
most sites were filled with ads, thereby abusing the popularity of
trademarks and diluting their revenue. Motivated by the findings
of that nine-year-old whitepaper, we performed the experiments
described in this paper finding millions of combosquatting domains
and analyzing registration and abuse trends over almost six years.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study a type of domain squatting termed “com-
bosquatting,” which has yet to be extensively studied by the se-
curity community. By registering domains that include popular
trademarks (e.g., paypal-members[.]com), attackers are able to
capitalize on a trademark’s recognition to perform social engineer-
ing, phishing, affiliate abuse, trademark abuse, and even targeted
attacks. We performed the first large-scale, empirical study of com-
bosquatting using 468 billion DNS records from both active and
passive DNS datasets, which were collected over an almost six year
time period. Lexical analysis of combosquatting domains revealed
that, while there is an almost infinite pool of potential combosquat-
ting domains, most instances add only a single token to the original
combosquatted domain. Furthermore, the chosen tokens were often
specifically targeted to a particular business category. These results
can help brands limit the potential search space for combosquatting
domains. Additionally, our results show that most combosquatting
domains were not remediated for extended periods of times—up
to 1,000 days in many cases. Furthermore, many instances of com-
bosquatting abuse were seen active significantly before they were
discovered by public blacklists or malware feeds. Consequently,
our findings suggests that current protections do not do a good
job at addressing the threat of combosquatting. This is particularly
concerning because our results also show that combosquatting is be-
coming more prevalent year over year. Lastly, we found numerous
instances of combosquatting abuse in the real world by crawling
1.3 million combosquatting domains and manually analyzing the
results. Based on our findings we discuss the role of different parties
in the domain name ecosystem and how each party can help tackle
the overall combosquatting problem. Ultimately, our results suggest
that combosquatting is a real and growing threat, and the security
community needs to develop better protections to defend against
it.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Selected Trademarks
Table 9 depicts the categories and respective number of trademarks
for each category we used to identify combosquatting domain
names. The second column provides an example of a trademark for
each category.
A.2 Most Frequent Words per Category
Table 10 summarizes the ten most frequent words for each trade-
mark category. There, we see that many of the popular words
closely correlate with the type of trademark being abused, such as,
the words apple, game, and phones being popular in the “Comput-
ers/Internet” category and the words president, vote, and elect in
the “Politics” category.
Moreover, we want to highlight the lists of words in the Couriers
and Financial categories. Several of the trademarks used in both
categories have been victims of spear phishing attacks according to
Garera et al. [40]. Additionally, words like tracking, delivery, service,
and account are used in both the creation of phishing domains and
phishing emails [37]. These results clearly indicate that most regis-
tered combosquatting domains have been carefully constructed by
attackers to match the expected context of each abused trademark
and can be used for a variety of purposes, ranging from trademark
abuse to phishing and spear-phishing campaigns.
A.3 Combosquatting APT Domains
Table 11 shows a list of combosquatting domain names related to
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT). These domains were found
Category Example Count
Adult Content youporn[.]com 11
Blogging blogspot[.]com 22
Computers adobe[.]com 10
Couriers fedex[.]com 1
E-Learning wikipedia[.]org 12
E-Shop (Auctions) craigslist[.]org 3
E-Shop (Online) amazon[.]com 16
E-Shop (Physical) costco[.]com 21
Energy chevron[.]com 15
File Sharing dropbox[.]com 4
Financial paypal[.]com 17
Lifestyle imdb[.]com 19
News nytimes[.]com 32
Photography tumblr[.]com 9
Politics democraticunderground[.]com 7
Radio & TV netflix[.]com 4
Search Engines google[.]com 6
Social Networks facebook[.]com 7
Software & Web office365[.]com 34
Streaming youtube[.]com 7
Telecom comcast[.]net 4
Travel expedia[.]com 7
Table 9: Trademark business categories.
in the public APT reports available at http://tinyurl.com/
apt-reports and our CP and CA datasets (Table 5).
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Category Most Frequent Words
Adult Content free xxx porn sex gay live tube porno videos hot
Blogging fuck yeah love themes free theme life blog best just
Computers apple games phones galaxy phone office free online support home
Couriers office ground online freight delivery express shipping print services service
E-Learning club square school business university health group property online pilgrim
E-Shop (Auctions) cars car sale account south new post posting san jobs
E-Shop (Online) line store kindle online shop free deals best lay card
E-Shop (Physical) price sale store card online prices home stores shop cheap
Energy card cards online business tex credit energy account chemical gift
File Sharing movie movies file free archive user content login online watch
Financial bank online investment service account services card worldwide mortgage update
Lifestyle world land channel vacation games princess movie villa paris club
News news mike online zine foundation com family new trust media
Photography marketing photography photo buy time followers family com photos best
Politics president vote elect official campaign trump truth com stop sucks
Radio & TV free movies watch xxx movie chill account login canada new
Search Engines plus mail search glass free apps com play maps google
Social Networks marketing followers free login buy account page com business apps
Software & Web best county new online mobile home free sucks beach city
Streaming video videos free download music views converter best buy listen
Telecom wireless universal phone business wire center online phones free net
Travel head island paris hotel garden inn hotels estate real beach
Table 10: Most frequent words per trademark category.
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Adobe adobearm[.]com DarkHotel 5/12 - 11/14 Unknown Actor [52]
Adobe adobekr[.]com Dust Storm 5/10 - 2/16 Unknown Actor [30]
Adobe adobeplugs[.]net DarkHotel 5/12 - 11/14 Unknown Actor [52]
Adobe adobeservice[.]net TooHash Unknown - 10/14 Chinese Origin [38]
Adobe adobeupdates[.]com DarkHotel 5/12 - 11/14 Unknown Actor [52]
Adobe adobeus[.]com Dust Storm 5/10 - 2/16 Unknown Actor [30]
Adobe plugin-adobe[.]com Saffron Rose Unknown - 5/14 Iranian Origin [35]
Amazon amazonwikis[.]com Dust Storm 5/10 - 2/16 Unknown Actor [30]
Delta deltae[.]com[.]br Comment Crew Unknown - 2/13 Unknown Actor [82]
Delta deltateam[.]ir Snake/Uroboros Uknown - 8/14 Unknown Actor [53]
Delta leveldelta[.]com MiniDuke 2/13 - 5/13 Unknown Actor [26]
Dropbox online-dropbox[.]com Asruex 10/15 - 6/16 Unknown Actor [49]
Facebook privacy-facebook[.]me Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [87]
Facebook users-facebook[.]com Saffron Rose Unknown - 5/14 Iranian Origin [35]
Facebook xn--facebook-06k[.]com Saffron Rose Unknown - 5/14 Iranian Origin [35]
Google all-google[.]com SpyNet Unknown - 8/14 Unknown Actor [60]
Google drive-google[.]co Rocket Kitten Unknown - 11/15 Iranian Origin [27]
Google drives-google[.]co Rocket Kitten Unknown - 11/15 Iranian Origin [27]
Google google-blogspot[.]com Quartermaster/Sunshop 5/13 - 11/13 Chinese Origin [36]
Google google-config[.]com Comfoo Unknown - 7/13 Unknown Actor [78]
Google google-dash[.]com Turbo Twist 4/16 - 4/16 C0d0s0 Team [34]
Google google-login[.]com Comfoo Unknown - 7/13 Unknown Actor [78]
Google google-office[.]com Enfal Unknown - 9/11 Chinese Origin [85]
Google google-officeonline[.]com Enfal Unknown - 9/11 Chinese Origin [85]
Google google-setting[.]com Rocket Kitten Unknown - 11/15 Iranian Origin [27]
Google google-verify[.]com Rocket Kitten Unknown - 11/15 Iranian Origin [27]
Google googlecaches[.]com ScanBox 9/14 - 10/14 Unknown Actor [71]
Google googlenewsup[.]net Roaming Tiger Unknown - 7/14 Chinese Origin [17]
Google googlesale[.]net Ixeshe 3/14 - 6/14 Chinese Origin [21]
Google googlesetting[.]com Sofacy 4/15 - 5/15 Russian Origin [75]
Google googletranslatione[.]com Trochilus 6/15 - 1/16 Unknown Actor [23]
Google googleupdate[.]hk Comfoo Unknown - 7/13 Unknown Actor [78]
Google googlewebcache[.]com ScanBox 9/14 - 10/14 Unknown Actor [71]
Google imggoogle[.]com DarkHotel 5/22 - 11/14 Unknown Actor [52]
Google privacy-google[.]com Saffron Rose Unknown - 5/14 Iranian Origin [35]
Google webmailgoogle[.]com ScanBox 9/14 - 10/14 Unknown Actor [71]
Google xn--google-yri[.]com Saffron Rose Unknown - 5/14 Iranian Origin [35]
iCloud localiser-icloud[.]com Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [87]
iCloud securityicloudservice[.]com Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [87]
Microsoft ftpmicrosoft[.]com Quartermaster/Sunshop 5/13 - 11/13 Chinese Origin [36]
Microsoft microsoft-cache[.]com Turbo Twist 4/16 - 4/16 C0d0s0 Team [34]
Microsoft microsoft-security-center[.]com Suckfly 7/15 - 5/16 Unknown Actor [84]
Microsoft microsoft-xpupdate[.]com DarkHotel 5/12 - 11/14 Unknown Actor [52]
Microsoft microsoftc1pol361[.]com Carbanak 10/14 - 2/15 Unknown Actor [51]
Microsoft microsoftmse[.]com Four Element Sword 10/14 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [22]
Mozilla mozillacdn[.]com Poseidon Group Unknown - 2/16 Poseidon Group [22]
Reuters reuters-press[.]com Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [87]
Skype downloadskype[.]cf PoisonIvy 6/14 - 4/15 Israelian Origin [72]
Yahoo cc-yahoo-inc[.]org Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [87]
Yahoo delivery-yahoo[.]com Sofacy II Unknown - 4/15 Unknown Actor [73]
Yahoo edit-mail-yahoo[.]com Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [87]
Yahoo help-yahoo-service[.]com Pawn Storm 2/16 - 4/16 Unknown Actor [87]
Yahoo newesyahoo[.]com Apt Against India Unknown - 8/13 Unknown Actor [45]
Yahoo privacy-yahoo[.]com Sofacy II Unknown - 4/15 Unknown Actor [73]
Yahoo settings-yahoo[.]com Sofacy II Unknown - 4/15 Unknown Actor [73]
Yahoo us-mg6mailyahoo[.]com Strontium Unknown - 11/15 Unknown Actor [61]
Yahoo yahoo-config[.]com Comfoo Unknown - 7/13 Unknown Actor [78]
Yahoo yahoo-user[.]com Comfoo Unknown - 7/13 Unknown Actor [78]
Yahoo yahooeast[.]net Hidden Lynx Unknown - 9/13 Unknown Actor [83]
Yahoo yahooip[.]net EvilGrab 9/13 - 1/14 Unknown Actor [86]
Yahoo yahoomail[.]com[.]co Saffron Rose Unknown - 5/14 Iranian Origin [35]
Yahoo yahooprotect[.]com EvilGrab 9/13 - 1/14 Unknown Actor [86]
Yahoo yahooprotect[.]net EvilGrab 9/13 - 1/14 Unknown Actor [86]
Yahoo yahooservice[.]biz DarkHotel 5/12 - 11/14 Unknown Actor [52]
Yahoo yahoowebnews[.]com IceFrog Unknown - 9/13 Chinese Origin [50]
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